A limit was essential both for the foe claim contract and for the political development process. Following an investigation that revealed a persistent disagreement between Inuit and Dene, the federal government asked John Parker, a former NWT representative, to recommend a uniform boundary between the two claim areas. Despite great dissatisfaction with parts of the Parker Line, Inuit leaders reluctantly accepted the border in July 1991, subject to a number of concessions at the national action table on land quantum and property rights. The urgent need for a demarcation line for the Nunavut and border process was the decisive factor for Inuit leaders. Had Nunavut not been in the equation, the border issue could have resulted in or fragmented the land`s claim to the founder or fragment into three regional Inuit claims. Barry Dewar is a retired federal public servant with a 30-year career in Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, which focuses on Aboriginal rights and rights. From 1979 to 1993, he was a member of the federal nunavut claim negotiating team and, from 1986 to 1993, a senior federal negotiator. He then served as Director General of Self-Management Negotiations and General Manager of the Global Demands Division. With the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal people and contractual rights in Section 35 of the Constitution Act in 1982, the Government of Canada faced increasing demands to change its overall requirement policy and, in particular, requirements for the abandonment or suppression of Aboriginal rights across the country.
In 1985, the federal government established a task force to hold national consultations and recommend a review of its damages policy. In late 1986, the federal cabinet adopted a revised comprehensive requirement policy, including a number of amendments favourable to Inuit negotiations. Many urban Canadians who have never been to the North have a positive or stereotypical image of Inuit who, more generally, supported the Inuit`s intention to negotiate an agreement on land rights and political development. Inuit leaders have characterized themselves as proud Canadians supporting Canada`s Arctic sovereignty, which has contributed to this image. In fact, the Inuit contribution to Canada`s Arctic sovereignty is mentioned in the preamble to the Nunavut agreement. In short, if the Government of Canada were not in time to reach an agreement with Inuit – Proud Canadians who defended Canada`s sovereignty in the Arctic – who could do that with? During the 1980s, the land claims team oversaw new progress that no longer occurred on the political development front, but maintained a complete separation between the initiatives. The LNCA, negotiated between 1980 and 1993, consists of more than 40 chapters dealing with wildlife and harvesting rights, water and environmental management systems, parks and protected areas, cultural heritage resources, employment and public procurement, as well as a number of other issues. The agreement ceded ownership of 350,000 square kilometres of land to the Inuit, including mineral rights over 36,000 square kilometres. It provided for capital transfers to Inuit of $1.14 billion and a current share of royalties from resource development within the residential area. Section 4 of the NLCA required Canada to introduce legislation on the creation of Nunavut. The federal government`s general refusal to resolve disputes, as provided for in the agreement, has embodied a growing gap between it and NTI.